Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal
Volume 37

Issue 2

4-26-2021

Continuation of Chapter 13 Postmortem: Why Courts Should
Allow Deceased Debtors' Cases to Continue Post Plan
Confirmation
Alexandra R. Byrne

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Alexandra R. Byrne, Continuation of Chapter 13 Postmortem: Why Courts Should Allow Deceased Debtors'
Cases to Continue Post Plan Confirmation, 37 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 427 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol37/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu.

BYRNE_4.19.21

4/19/2021 10:47 AM

CONTINUATION OF CHAPTER 13 POSTMORTEM: WHY
COURTS SHOULD ALLOW DECEASED DEBTORS’ CASES TO
CONTINUE POST PLAN CONFIRMATION
ABSTRACT
A lack of direct guidance from Rule 1016 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure has created inconsistency among bankruptcy courts regarding
whether to continue a chapter 13 case if the debtor dies post plan confirmation
but before discharge. Rule 1016 allows a deceased debtor’s chapter 13 case to
continue if “further administration is possible” and it is “in the best interests of
the parties.” Although dismissal is appropriate if the debtor dies before plan
confirmation, continuation after plan confirmation is possible and benefits all
parties.
The benefits of continuation post plan confirmation stem from the certainty
under federal bankruptcy law regarding what pre-petition creditors will receive
and allows beneficiaries and post-petition creditors to have access to the
decedent’s assets in probate, rather than all three parties fighting over the
decedent’s assets in probate. Continuation of the bankruptcy case results in
creditors receiving their expected distribution amount under the confirmed
payment plan (through continued plan payments made by the decedent’s
beneficiaries) or unsecured creditors receiving at least as much as they would
have received under chapter 7 (through conversion to chapter 7). A hardship
discharge may also be warranted if the decedent’s unsecured creditors have
already received at least as much as they would have under chapter 7. Courts
should permit continuation of the bankruptcy case and ultimately award a
discharge if a chapter 13 debtor dies post plan confirmation because it will
create uniformity among bankruptcy courts, equitable treatment among chapter
13 and chapter 7 debtors, and more certainty to both the decedent’s
beneficiaries and her creditors.
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INTRODUCTION
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an option for individual debtors
to retain their property, restructure their finances, and repay their creditors over
time.1 To qualify for chapter 13, an individual debtor must have regular annual
income and debts below a threshold amount.2 This opens eligibility for chapter
13 to sole proprietorships3 and unemployed or retired individuals who have a
regular source of income.4 Although a beneficial option for individual debtors,
the majority of chapter 13 cases are dismissed by the bankruptcy court before
the debtor receives a discharge,5 with only about one-third receiving a
discharge.6 One reason for dismissal is the death of the debtor.
Courts look to Rule 1016 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
(“FRBP”) for guidance if a chapter 13 debtor dies after filing for bankruptcy.
Rule 1016, however, provides little instruction and leaves much discretion to the
court to interpret its application. These interpretations vary between and within
jurisdictions. “[T]he confusion rendered by the death of a chapter 13 debtor
alone decries the need for reform, and at the very least greater uniformity.”7
Under Rule 1016, if a chapter 13 debtor dies, “the case may be dismissed; or if
further administration is possible and in the best interests of the parties, the case
may proceed and be concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though
the death . . . had not occurred.”8 Variations by the courts center around
determining what constitutes “further administration” and what is “in the best
interests of the parties.” Courts consistently hold that dismissal is warranted if
the debtor dies before plan confirmation.9 This is because the debtor’s
1

See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2019).
See id. § 109(e). Originally, chapter 13 was only an option for “wage earners,” which excluded
individuals who now can file under chapter 13 including retired individuals. DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
BANKRUPTCY: DEALING WITH FINANCIAL FAILURE FOR INDIVIDUALS AND BUSINESSES 237 (4th ed. 2006).
3
Chapter 13 provides another option separate from chapter 11 reorganization. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 2, at 237.
4
This can include annuity payments or social security benefits. See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 237.
5
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 237. This can be contrasted with a majority of individual chapter
7 cases that end in a discharge. Ed Flynn, The Changing Profile of Chapter 7 Filers, AM. BANKR. INS. (Sept.
2018) (“The vast majority of chapter 7 debtors successfully obtain a discharge. In fact, more than 70 percent
have been discharged within five months of filing.”).
6
See Sara S. Green, Parina Patel & Katherine Porter, Cracking the Code: An Empirical Analysis of
Consumer Bankruptcy Outcomes, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2017); Ed Flynn, Success Rates in Chapter
13, AM. BANKR. INST. 1, 2 (2017).
7
John E. Pevy, Few Things Are Certain in Life, Even Less Are Certain in Death and Bankruptcy, 17
TENN. J. BUS. L. 309, 320 (2016) .
8
FED R. BANKR. P. 1016
9
See In re Waring, 555 B.R. 754, 764 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016) (dismissing case because the debtor died
pre-plan confirmation); In re Brown, No. 12-07082-JW, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1300, at *12 (Bankr. D.S.C. Mar.
2
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participation is necessary during the plan confirmation process.10 Courts,
however, are very inconsistent in deciding whether to continue a case if a debtor
dies after plan confirmation.11
This Comment focuses on the divergent interpretations of Rule 1016 by
bankruptcy courts. These interpretations demonstrate the various ways a chapter
13 case can continue after the debtor dies. First, Section I provides background
on the differences between filing under chapter 7 and chapter 13 to provide
context for the differences in the application of Rule 1016. Next, Parts A and B
of Section I discuss the different interpretations of what constitutes “further
administration” and how to determine what is “in the best interests of the
parties.” Several policies underlie the varying interpretations, and they too will
be examined. Section II will then examine the different ways a chapter 13 case
can continue postmortem and how each option benefits debtors, creditors, and
beneficiaries of the deceased debtor. This Comment concludes by contemplating
policy considerations for continuing a chapter 13 case, including consistency
and equitableness in comparison to the procedure followed in chapter 7 cases.
I.

BACKGROUND

Bankruptcy courts look to Rule 1016 if a debtor dies during the pendency of
her chapter 13 case. It states:
Death or incompetency of the debtor shall not abate a liquidation case
under chapter 7 of the Code. In such event the estate shall be
administered and the case concluded in the same manner, so far as
possible, as though the death or incompetency had not occurred. If a
reorganization, family farmer’s debt adjustment, or individual’s debt
adjustment case is pending under chapter 11, chapter 12, or chapter 13,
the case may be dismissed; or if further administration is possible and
in the best interest of the parties, the case may proceed and be
concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though the death
or incompetency had not occurred.12

25, 2013) (denying grant of hardship discharge because debtor died pre-plan confirmation).
10
See In re Waring, 555 B.R. at 764; In re Brown, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1300 at *12.
11
See In re Moore, No. 15-62639, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2017)
(stating that “case law [regarding dead debtors] looks like a seismograph needle in the middle of an earthquake”).
Compare In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 537 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007) (continuing the case after plan confirmation)
with In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. 338, 340 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (dismissing the case after plan confirmation).
12
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016
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According to the “Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules,” both chapter 11 and
chapter 13 cases will likely be dismissed.13
The case law involving incompetency in bankruptcy is underdeveloped.14
Because there is no federal statute that sets forth the criteria to determine
incompetency, bankruptcy courts either require the state court to determine
incompetency or the bankruptcy court itself applies the law of the debtor’s
domicile.15 “In common understanding, the term ‘incompetent’ refers to a person
who lacks the mental competence or capacity to make decisions or conduct her
own legal or business affairs.”16 Rule 1004.1 applies if an incompetent debtor
files for bankruptcy.17 In such cases, the personal representative of an
incompetent debtor “may file a voluntary petition”18 and a representative may
be appointed by the court if the debtor doesn’t already have one.19
Rule 1016 also applies if the debtor becomes incompetent after filing for
bankruptcy.20 In re Moss followed a two-step process to determine if the debtor’s
chapter 7 case could be continued.21 First, the court determined if the debtor was
incompetent; in this case, incompetence had already been determined by another
court.22 Second, the court determined if the case could be continued “in the same
manner as if the incompetency had not occurred.”23 The court reasoned that
although the debtor’s incompetency prevented the case from being administered
“as usual,”24 the case did not need to be dismissed.25 Rather, the appointment of
a limited guardian was viable and necessary to continue the case.26 The court
13
Id. (noting “In a chapter 11 reorganization case or chapter 13 individual’s debt adjustment case, the
likelihood is that the case will be dismissed.”).
14
See In re Moss, 239 B.R. 537, 538 (Bankr. W.D. Miss. 1999) (addressing the question as an issue of
first impression).
15
See In re Sniff, No. 15-18086, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3979, at *7–8 (Bank. D. Colo. Oct. 6, 2015); In re
Moss, 239 B.R. at 539; In re Moody, 105 B.R. 368, 371 (S.D. Tex. 1989).
16
In re Ford, No. 08-4069, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 801, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Mar. 3, 2009).
17
See In re Sniff, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3979 at *9 (quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 1004.1).
18
Id.; see also In re Kjellsen, 155 B.R. 1013, 1018 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1993) (reasoning that incompetent
people are not barred from filing for bankruptcy because the Bankruptcy Code allows involuntary petitions to
be filed against incompetent persons).
19
See In re Sniff, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3979 at *7.
20
See In re Moss, 239 B.R. at 539; In re Sniff, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3979 at *5–6.
21
See In re Moss, 239 B.R. at 539.
22
See id. at 540–42 (adopting district court’s ruling that the debtor was incompetent to stand criminal
trial); see also In re Ivers, 2019 Bankr. LEXIS 3504, at *35 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019) (referring
competency determination to be made by the county adult protective services).
23
In re Moss, 239 B.R. at 542–45 (internal citations omitted).
24
Id. at 542 (reasoning that the case cannot be administered “as usual” because of the debtor’s rash
behavior and her illness was likely to prevent her from focusing on her case and protect her rights).
25
See id. at 545.
26
See id. at 542 (“[T]he only questions the Court must address are whether it would be possible to proceed
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opined that a limited guardian would protect the debtor’s rights and ensure that
the benefits of bankruptcy are available to debtors who become incompetent.27
Although there appear to be no published cases involving a chapter 13 debtor
who becomes incompetent after filing for bankruptcy, courts are likely to follow
the same procedure that In re Moss did and appoint a limited guardian to
represent the incompetent debtor in the administration of her case.28 An issue
may arise as to whether the incompetency restricts the debtor’s access to
employment and therefore affects her ability to contribute her disposable
income. The court would have to evaluate whether any payments that the debtor
is receiving—such as social security or other support payments—are sufficient
to pay the creditors. If not, the court should conduct a similar analysis as if the
debtor died, including determining if converting the case to chapter 7 is
necessary to continue the administration of the case or if the debtor satisfies the
hardship discharge requirements.29
Continuation of a case after the death of a debtor stems from the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.30 Section 8 of this act stated that “[t]he death . . . of a bankrupt shall
not abate the proceedings but the same shall be conducted and concluded in the
same manner, so far as possible, as though he had not died . . . .”31 Rule 1016
maintains the language of Section 8 on continuing the case, “as though he [the
debtor] had not died” but does not specify how the chapter 13 case should
continue.32 However, it does provide two parameters that can help guide courts
in determining how to proceed: (1) further administration must be possible and
(2) continuation must be in the best interests of the parties.33
Additionally, if the bankruptcy case continues, the decedent’s probate
proceedings generally can continue.34 “This stems from the fact that bankruptcy
and probate jurisdictions are both fundamentally in rem.”35 As such, the
bankruptcy court and the probate court would administer the particular assets
in the same manner as if the incompetency had not occurred, and if not, whether the appointment of a limited
guardian would be an appropriate measure.”).
27
See id. at 543.
28
See id. at 545.
29
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2019).
30
See In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 534 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007).
31
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Pub. L. 55-541, § 8, 30 Stat. 544, 549 (1898) (repealed 1978).
32
Compare id., with FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016 (keeping the language “as though the death or incompetency
had not occurred.”).
33
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016.
34
See David B. Young, The Intersection of Bankruptcy and Probate, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 351, 367 (2007)
(stating that “a bankruptcy and a probate proceeding may go forward parallel to one another”).
35
Id.
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and address the particular claims subject to its jurisdiction if the bankruptcy case
continues. This means that if a chapter 7 debtor dies before discharge, the
bankruptcy court will continue to exercise jurisdiction over the assets and claims
that are part of the bankruptcy estate while the probate court will have
jurisdiction over post-petition assets and exempt property not included in the
bankruptcy estate.36 The property of the bankruptcy estate will continue to be
liquidated and distributed among the remaining creditors.37 In chapter 13,
property of the bankruptcy estate will remain under the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court until a discharge is awarded38 while the probate court will have
jurisdiction over property not included in the bankruptcy estate pursuant to
section 522 of the Code.39 However, the probate proceeding may be stalled in
some instances. For example, in Georgia, the exemption amount for “household
goods, furnishings, books” and other similar items is $5,000.40 If these items
exceed the exemption amount, the trustee may sell these items to distribute the
non-exempt amount to the bankruptcy creditors, and thus, stall the distribution
of the exempt amount to the decedent’s beneficiaries or post-petition creditors.
If the chapter 7 or chapter 13 bankruptcy case was dismissed, the probate court
would acquire jurisdiction over the assets formerly in the bankruptcy estate.
Under chapter 7 of the Code, the debtor’s property is separated into two
categories: exempt property and non-exempt property. Determining what
property is exempt depends on state law.41 Congress created a set of exemptions
included in the Code but allows each state to opt out of those provisions in favor
of state law.42 For example, in Georgia, the debtor must use the state exemptions
but also has access to certain federal exemptions (such as federal and military
retirement accounts and disability benefits).43 Federal bankruptcy law provides
greater exemption amounts compared to Georgia, except for motor vehicles.44
While the exemption amount for motor vehicles is up to $5,000 in Georgia,45 the
federal bankruptcy exemption amount is $4,000.46 Furthermore, federal
exemptions are adjusted for inflation under section 104.47
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 367–68.
See id. at 368.
See id.
See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (2019).
Ga. Code. Ann. § 44-13-100(a)(4).
See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2).
Id.
Ga. Code Ann. § 44-13-100(b).
Id. § 44-13-100(a); 11 U.S.C. § 522(d).
Ga. Code Ann. § 44-13-100(a)(3).
11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2).
Id. § 104.
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The debtor must also satisfy domiciliary requirements to use the state’s
exemption laws.48 The debtor must be domiciled in the state for 730 days before
filing to satisfy the requirement.49 If the debtor was not domiciled in one state
during that period, then the state’s exemption laws that the debtor was domiciled
in for at least 180 days (or the state they resided in longest for the 180 day period)
preceding the 730 days before filing would apply.50 If the debtor fails to meet
any of these domiciliary requirements, then the federal exemptions apply.51
Debtors who decide to pursue bankruptcy relief under chapter 7 must pass
the “means test”52 if their debts are primarily consumer debts.53 This test was
added as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2005, which sought to make the eligibility requirements to file under chapter
7 more strict.54 “The means test creates a presumption of abuse for debtors who
seek to liquidate their debt in a chapter 7 bankruptcy, but who appear capable of
repaying at least a portion of their debt.”55 If the debtor is unable to rebut this
presumption, the debtor can seek bankruptcy relief through chapter 13.56 The
test requires a comparison of the debtor’s current monthly income57 with the
median family income58 in the state where the debtor filed for bankruptcy.59 If
the debtor’s current monthly income is less than the median income for a
similarly-sized household, the debtor passes the means test and can file under
chapter 7.60 If the current monthly income is above the median income, the test
48

Id. § 522(b)(3).
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. § 707(b); see Kathleen Murphy & Justin H. Dion, “Means Test” or “Just a Mean Test”: An
Examination of the Requirement that Converted Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Debtors Comply with Amended Section
707(b), 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 413, 435 (2008) (stating that “in order to facilitate the execution of the
means test calculations, Official Form [22A] is completed by every debtor [filing under chapter 7] and [must be]
filed along with his schedules.”) (alterations in original).
53
See 11 U.S.C. § 101(8) (“The term ‘consumer debt’ means debt incurred by an individual primarily for
a personal, family, or household purpose.”).
54
See Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 413–14.
55
Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 434.
56
Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 431 (discusses the legislative history of the means test and its
purpose of discouraging people with the ability to repay their debts from filing under chapter 7).
57
Current monthly income is the average monthly income from all sources that the debtor receives during
the six month period, “ending on the last day of the calendar month immediately preceding the date of the
commencement of the case if the debtor files the schedule of current income” or “the date on which the current
income is determined by the court” 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A); see id. § 101(10A)(B) (excluding benefits received
under the Social Security Act).
58
Id. § 101(39A) (stating “the median family income both calculated and reported by the Bureau of the
Census in the most recent year”).
59
See Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 436.
60
See Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 436.
49
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then requires the debtor to deduct certain expenses to determine her monthly
disposable income.61 If the debtor’s monthly disposable income is equal to or
greater than the amounts listed under section 707(b)(2)(A), the debtor is
prevented from filing under chapter 7.62 However, the debtor can rebut this
presumption of abuse by identifying special circumstances that support an
adjustment to the calculation of her current monthly income,63 and then
reevaluating whether the adjusted income satisfies the means test.64
The debtor’s non-exempt property is turned over to the bankruptcy trustee
and becomes the property of the bankruptcy estate, subject to exceptions.65 One
exception is contained in section 554, which provides that “after notice and a
hearing, the trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome
to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.”66
Abandoned property is likely to be assets worth the value of a creditor’s secured
interest, leaving no remaining value for unsecured creditors.67 After determining
what property is part of the bankruptcy estate, the property is then liquidated and
distributed among the debtor’s creditors by the trustee.68
Discharge under chapter 7 provides the debtor with a fresh start because she
is no longer personally liable for the discharged debts.69 Additionally, a
discharge under chapter 7 occurs much earlier and is granted more frequently
than in chapter 13 cases.70 Chapter 7 debtors receive a discharge 60 days after
the first meeting of the creditors,71 whereas chapter 13 debtors have payment
plans that can range from three to five years.72 Also, the majority of chapter 7
cases are granted a discharge, with 84.3% of chapter 7 cases discharged in
61

Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 436.
See 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(i) (“the court shall presume abuse exists if the debtor’s current monthly
income reduced by the amounts determined . . . and multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of . . . 25 percent
of the debtor’s nonpriority unsecured claims in the case, or $8,175, whichever is greater; or $13,650.”).
63
See id. § 707(b)(2)(B); Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 438 (“The statute specifically names
circumstances which are to be considered special circumstances including a serious medical condition or active
military service.”) (emphasis added).
64
Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 438.
65
See 11 U.S.C. § 722.
66
Id. § 554(a).
67
2 Farm Income Tax Manual § 9.05(5)(b)(i) (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2020).
68
See 11 U.S.C. § 726.
69
See id. § 727(b).
70
See Discharge in Bankruptcy—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-bankruptcy-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Jan. 13, 2021).
71
Id. (noting that discharge occurs sixty days after the first meeting of the creditors, which happens about
four months after filing bankruptcy petition).
72
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (discharge is not granted until “after completion by the debtor of all payments
under the plan,” and the plans are usually 3 to 5 years in total).
62
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2016,73 as opposed to only 38.8% of chapter 13 cases discharged between 2010
and 2016.74 However, the consequences of filing under chapter 7 are significant
because the debtor is likely to lose ownership of some of her property and the
debtor will not be able to receive a discharge under this chapter again for eight
years after commencement.75 Furthermore, the scope of discharge under chapter
7 is more narrow than under chapter 13.76 Thus, the chapter 7 debtor is still
personally liable for the debts listed in section 523(a) even after the case has
ended.77
Alternatively, a debtor who files under chapter 13 must be an “individual
with regular income”78 and have debts that do not exceed the statutory limit set
out in section 109(e).79 The debtor is allowed to retain her property but must
give up future income to pay creditors over a period of three to five years.80
Thus, unlike in chapter 7, the property of the estate includes post-petition
earnings.81 The debtor is also very involved in developing the payment plan and
is given the opportunity to propose a plan that will be approved by her
creditors.82 “The chapter 13 system was designed to allow the court, the debtor,
and the creditors maximum flexibility to achieve the goals of fairness to creditors
and a realistic fresh start for the debtor.”83 Filing under chapter 13 provides the
debtor with numerous benefits while living that she wouldn’t receive if she filed
under chapter 7, such as receiving a broader discharge,84 having the ability to
modify certain secured debts,85 the retention of her property,86 an automatic stay
73

Flynn, supra note 6, at 5.
See Flynn, supra note 6, at 2.
75
See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(8).
76
See Discharge in Bankruptcy—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/servicesforms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-bankruptcy-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (noting that
there are debts dischargeable under chapter 13 that are not dischargeable under Chapter 7).
77
11 U.S.C. § 523(a). Nondischargeable debts include a tax or customs duty, fraudulent returns, willful
and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity, and a fine that benefits a governmental unit. Id.
78
Id. § 101(30) (“The term individual with regular income means an individual whose income is
sufficiently stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under chapter 13 of this
title . . . .”); Young, supra note 34, at 365–66 (The Code defines an individual as a “person,” which a probate
estate is not.).
79
11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The debtor must owe on the date of filing less than $419,275 in noncontingent,
liquidated, unsecured debts and less than $1,257,850 of noncontingent, liquidated, secured debts. The dollar
amounts are changed every three years. Id. § 104(a).
80
See id. § 1322(a).
81
See id. § 1306(a)(2).
82
See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3015(b).
83
Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers’ Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74
IND. L.J. 455, 460 (1999).
84
See id. at 461.
85
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b).
86
Id. § 1322(b).
74
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applied to guarantors,87 the ability to save her primary residence from
foreclosure,88 and experiencing less shame because she is making a concerted
effort to repay her creditors.89 Furthermore, the debtor is able to file and receive
a discharge again in two years.90 The fact that chapter 13 affords greater benefits
to the debtor than she would receive under chapter 7 clearly evidences a policy
of encouraging debtors to choose chapter 13 over chapter 7.
The procedure followed if a debtor dies during a chapter 7 case is more
straightforward because the debtor no longer plays an active role in the
proceedings and creditors can continue to be paid from the deceased debtor’s
property in the bankruptcy estate, which has been in the possession of the chapter
7 trustee since commencement of the case.91 Therefore, the deceased debtor’s
non-exempt assets continue to be liquidated and distributed by the trustee to the
various creditors.92 However, in chapter 13 cases, the procedure followed if the
debtor dies is not as straightforward because the debtor does not have the ability
to contribute her future income.93 As such, Rule 1016 posits two options: (1) the
case may be dismissed, or (2) the case may proceed if further administration is
possible and is in the best interest of the parties.
A. Further Administration
Courts generally find that further administration is only possible if a payment
plan has been confirmed prior to the debtor’s death.94 Two main reasons justify
this outcome. First, the debtor’s involvement in the payment plan is necessary
because the plan provides a roadmap of how the case should be further
administered.95 The plan confirmation process requires a significant amount of
negotiation between the debtor and creditors to confirm a plan that meets all of
the requirements under the Code.96 This roadmap consists of a definitive amount
87

Id. § 1301(a).
See DeJarnatt, supra note 83, at 461.
89
See DeJarnatt, supra note 83, at 459; Pamela Foohey et al., “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, 90 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1055, 1064 (2017) (“because chapter 13 will allow them to pay their creditors more, people may decide
that filing under chapter 13 is the moral and ‘the right thing’ to do.”).
90
11 U.S.C § 1328(f)(2).
91
See In re Waring, 555 B.R. 754, 761 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016).
92
See In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 534 (Bankr. S.D. III. 2007).
93
See In re Shorter, 544 B.R. 654, 660–61 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015).
94
In re Waring, 555 B.R. at 764 (dismissing case because the debtor died pre-plan confirmation); In re
Brown, No. 12-07082-JW, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 1300, at *12–14 (Bankr. D.S.C. Mar. 25, 2013) (denying grant
of hardship discharge because debtor died pre-plan confirmation).
95
See In re Waring, 555 B.R. at 765 (“The debt adjustment plan is the key of the Chapter 13 process. It
is the document that sets the terms making possible further administration.”) (emphasis added).
96
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2019).
88
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each creditor will receive, which allows further administration to be possible.97
The lack of a confirmed plan gives courts a reasonable basis to dismiss the case
and lets the creditors fight it out in probate court instead of bankruptcy court.98
Because of the debtor’s active involvement in chapter 13—through proposing
the payment plan and contributing her disposable income—chapter 13 cases are
more likely to be dismissed than chapter 7 cases.99 Second, the debtor is the only
one who can file a plan according to section 1321.100
In re Fogel centered its holding on the confirmation of the plan, setting forth
its analysis by considering whether further administration of the plan is possible
and in the best interests of the parties.101 Furthermore, continuing a case before
plan confirmation can be construed as a way for the debtor’s personal
representative or his beneficiaries to cheat the system and essentially get around
the rule that a probate estate cannot file for bankruptcy. Only “persons” can file
for bankruptcy, and an estate is not a person.102 However, once a plan has been
confirmed that represents the debtor and creditors’ interests, the process is far
enough along that it is less susceptible to abuse, and further administration
without the debtor’s participation is possible.
Dismissing the chapter 13 case pre-plan confirmation can occur in jointly
filed cases if one spouse dies.103 Spouses can file jointly for bankruptcy pursuant
to section 302(a), and the case will be jointly administered.104 Generally, if the
co-debtor’s estates are of a separate nature, courts dismiss the deceased co-

97
See In re Levy, No. 11-60130, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2014)
(reasoning that further administration was possible because a plan was confirmed prior to the debtor’s death and
co-debtor completed all the plan payments).
98
See In re Waring, 555 B.R. at 765 (reasoning that because the debtor died shortly after filing for
bankruptcy, it would be better for the issues involved in the case to be handled by probate).
99
See id. at 764.
100
See 9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1016.04 (16th ed. 2020); In re Martinez, No. 13-50438-CAG, 2013
Bankr. LEXIS 4853, at *2–3 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 2013); In re Waring, 555 B.R. at 762.
101
In re Fogel, 550 B.R. 532, 535 (D. Colo. 2015).
102
See In re Walters, 113 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990); In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385, at
*3–4 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2017); In re Navarro, No. 12-21062PM, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 4929, at *4 (Bankr.
D. Md. Oct. 18, 2012); In re Roberts, No. 05-26653 ESD, 2005 Bankr. LEXIS 2280, at *1–4 (Bankr. D. Md.
Aug. 15, 2005).
103
See In re Waring, 555 B.R. at 756; In re Wilson, 2016 Bankr. LEXIS 595, at *1–2 n.1 (Bankr. S.D. W.
Va. Feb. 22, 2016).
104
11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2019); In re Roberts, 570 B.R. 532, 542 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2017); In re Waring,
555 B.R. at 765–66 (reasoning that a joint petition is only procedural and commences two different bankruptcy
cases with just one petition); In re Estrada, 224 B.R. 132, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1998) (“Section 302 is designed for the
ease of administration and to permit the payment of one filing fee.”).
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debtor from the case, while giving the surviving co-debtor the option of
amending the petition to continue the bankruptcy case.105
Courts are inconsistent as to what further administration looks like if a debtor
dies post plan confirmation. Courts that allow the case to be discharged
postmortem have three options: (1) allow the debtor’s beneficiaries to continue
the plan payments, (2) convert the case to chapter 7, or (3) grant a hardship
discharge. However, courts that decide to dismiss such cases strictly adhere to
the “fresh start” principle and reason that Rule 1016 should be interpreted
narrowly to only permit continuation if the debtor has done everything short of
being awarded a discharge.
1. Conversion to Chapter 7
Whether a chapter 13 case can be converted to a chapter 7 case if the debtor
dies is a question that yields inconsistent results.106 In chapter 7 cases, the
debtor’s non-exempt assets are liquidated and distributed among creditors in
order of priority according to section 726.107 Converting the case to chapter 7
would increase the likelihood of discharging the debtor’s debts because chapter
7 liquidation does not rely on the debtor’s future income like chapter 13 plans
do.108 Additionally, conversion allows the unsecured creditors to receive
distributions that they would be entitled to receive under chapter 7. This prevents
uncertainty over what they would receive if the chapter 13 case was dismissed
and their claims were handled in probate court.
Uncertainty arises because of the priority of the estate administration
expenses over unsecured creditors’ claims. In Georgia, expenses that exist in
probate that come before unsecured creditors include a year’s support for the
family, funeral expenses, and reasonable expenses of the decedent’s last
illness.109 These expenses diminish the funds available to unsecured creditors
and may result in those creditors receiving less through probate than if the case
was converted to chapter 7. While there are also administrative expenses in
bankruptcy court, there are certain rules on how much certain creditors need to

105
See In re Levy, No. 11-60130, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2014); In
re Waring, 555 B.R. at 756.
106
Compare In re Roberts, 570 B.R. at 539–42 (holding conversion from chapter 13 to chapter 7 is
permitted under rule 1016), with In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385 at *3–5 (holding conversion from
chapter 13 to chapter 7 is not permitted).
107
11 U.S.C. § 726 (2019).
108
See In re Lucio, 251 B.R. 705, 709 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000).
109
See, e.g., Ga. Code. Ann. § 53-7-40.
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be paid.110 For example, in chapter 13, unsecured creditors need to be paid at
least as much as they would have under chapter 7.111 However, the distributions
to creditors may differ in probate because the amount distributed does not have
to follow the plan payment amount and creditors can try to claim the full debt
owed, leaving less money for lower priority creditors. Also, the added expenses
involved in estate administration including attorneys’ fees, accounting fees,
probate representative compensation, and court costs all reduce the available
source of repayment to creditors, which have already been reduced by the
administrative costs that were incurred during the bankruptcy case.112
Courts that allow conversion to chapter 7 reason that the language of Rule
1016—particularly, “the estate shall be administered, and the case concluded in
the same manner, so far as possible, as though the death . . . had not occurred”—
allows actions that the debtor could have taken if still alive, which includes
conversion to chapter 7.113 Following this logic, these courts consider the
eligibility to convert to chapter 7 at the time the debtor filed the case.114
However, courts that do not allow conversion take a more constrained view of
“further administration” to include only what is naturally involved in a chapter
13 case: completing plan payments and receiving a discharge, not conversion of
the case.115 These courts rationalize this position by focusing on eligibility to file
under chapter 7 at the time of conversion.116 According to section 109(b), only
a “person” may be a debtor under chapter 7.117 A person is defined as an
“individual, partnership, [or] corporation.”118 Finding that a decedent’s probate

110
See generally 11 U.S.C. § 503(b) (defining priority of payment); id. § 1325(a) (discussing how much
each creditor must be paid for plan confirmation).
111
See id. § 1325(a)(4).
112
See Ga. Code Ann. § 53-5-26 (covering estate administration costs, including attorneys’ fees); id. § 536-60 (covering accounting fees and probate representation compensation); id. § 53-6-61 (covering reasonable
expenses for representatives).
113
See In re Roberts, 570 B.R. 532, 539–41 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2017) (quoting FED. R. BANK. P. 1016);
see also Murphy & Dion, supra note 52, at 419 (arguing that the means test should not be used when chapter 13
debtors convert to chapter 7 because “it does not serve any legitimate purpose for debtors who have already
attempted a chapter 13 reorganization.”).
114
See In re Roberts, 570 B.R. at 539.
115
See In re Moore, No. 15-62639, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2017); In
re Spiser, 232 B.R. 669, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999) (“The term ‘further administration’ implies that the case
would be carried to its normal conclusion with payments to the creditors as provided in the confirmed plan . . .
.”).
116
See In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385 at *4 (“Conversion results from a change in circumstances
warranting alteration in the original tack of the case, facts which should not be ignored.”). But see In re Perkins,
381 B.R. 530, 535–36 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007) (reasoning eligibility should be determined at the time of filing the
bankruptcy petition and should not be affected by post-petition events).
117
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b) (2019).
118
Id. § 101(41).
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estate does not qualify as a “person” as required to file under chapter 7 leads
these courts to determine that postmortem conversion from chapter 13 to chapter
7 is not permissible.119
Courts also hold that deceased debtors and personal representatives cannot
be eligible to convert the case to chapter 7.120 Because deceased debtors are not
eligible for bankruptcy at the time of conversion, their existing case cannot be
converted.121
If substitution of the debtor’s personal representative was an available
option . . . [Rule 1016] is where that would be specified; yet, where
parties are concerned the rule contemplates doing nothing. The case
proceeds to some sort of ending without any change in the identity of
the debtor and as though the debtor had never died.122

Furthermore, some courts decline to permit conversion to chapter 7 solely
on the basis that conversion does not comport with one of the twin aims of
bankruptcy: to provide a fresh start to the debtor.123 If the debtor is deceased, he
no longer needs a fresh start and therefore cannot personally benefit from a
discharge of his debts.124
However, instead of focusing on the policy goal of a fresh start, In re Inyard
focuses on the policy goal of not discouraging debtors from filing under chapter
13.125 The chapter 13 debtor has voluntarily taken on greater responsibility to
repay her debts rather than simply liquidating her assets under chapter 7. “It is
important to consider the equities with respect to the debtor himself, because . .
. despite his death, he remains eligible for further administration of his case, and
he is an appropriate person for consideration when balancing the equities.”126
Thus, by shifting the focus on achieving equity among chapter 7 and chapter 13

119
See id. § 101(41) (“The term person includes an individual, partnership, and corporation . . . .”)
(emphasis added); In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. 338, 342 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013); In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS
3385 at *3–4; In re Jarrett, 19 B.R. 413, 414 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1982).
120
See, e.g., In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385 at *3–4; In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. 338, 340–42 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 2013). But see In re Perkins, 381 B.R. at 537.
121
See In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385 at *3–4; see also In re Jarret, 19 B.R. at 414 (extending
application of the eligibility requirement to prevent the deceased debtor from continuing his or her case under
chapter 13).
122
In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. at 340.
123
See, e.g., In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385 at *4–5; In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. at 340–41.
124
See In re Moore, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 3385 at *4–5. But see In re Inyard, 532 B.R. at 372 (the “fresh
start” still applies to a deceased debtor).
125
See In re Inyard, 532 B.R. at 372.
126
Id.
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case outcomes, the court interpreted Rule 1016 to allow further
administration.127
2. Who Can Act on the Debtor’s Behalf?
Rule 1016 contemplates that someone must act on the debtor’s behalf to
continue administration of the case.128 If the debtor dies, the counsel for the
debtor should notify the court and file a motion to designate an individual to act
on the debtor’s behalf, or risk dismissal of the case.129
Courts are split on whether the personal representative of the debtor’s
probate estate can continue the case on the debtor’s behalf.130 In re Shepherd did
not allow a personal representative of the debtor to be a substitute for the debtor
in order to modify the payment plan even though there were no objections by
the creditors or the trustee.131 The court reasoned that “[t]here is no mechanism
in either the Bankruptcy Code or the rules of procedure for substituting another
[individual] for the debtor in a bankruptcy case.”132 Further, the court also
pointed to the fact that “a debtor who has died has no need of a fresh start,”133
and therefore such a case should be dismissed.134 However, the court did not
explain how any case in which a chapter 13 debtor dies could proceed as
contemplated under Rule 1016.
In re Koskinski addressed this issue and came to a contrary result, reasoning
that
[i]f no party could ever act on behalf of a deceased debtor because
there is no separate rule specifically providing for formal substitution,
the provisions in Rule 1016 allowing a case to continue after the
debtor’s death would be meaningless . . . Under Rule 1016, an
appropriate representative of the debtor may act on behalf of the debtor
without a formal substitution.135

127

Id. at 371–72.
See id. at 368; In re Kosinski, No. 10-bk-28949, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 779, at *3–4 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
Mar. 5, 2015); In re Stewart, No. 01-66434-fra13, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1042, at *2–4 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 2,
2004).
129
See In re Vetter, No. 11-03988-dd, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2017, at *4–6 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 7, 2012).
130
Compare In re Quint, No. 11-04296-jw, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2881, at *7 (Bankr. D.S.C. June 22, 2012)
(allowing a special administrator to continue to administer the case on the debtor’s behalf), with In re Shepherd,
490 B.R. 338, 340 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013) (holding that the personal representative cannot represent the debtor).
131
In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. at 339–40.
132
Id. at 340.
133
Id. at 341.
134
See In re Hennessy, No. 11-13793, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3034, at *4 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 29, 2013).
135
In re Kosinski, No. 10-bk-28949, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 779, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. III. Mar. 5, 2015); see
128
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Similarly, In re Oliver allowed the personal representative of the decedent’s
probate estate to stand in the shoes of the debtor because there was no evidence
that the personal representative was not an adequate substitute or that he or she
would negatively affect the administration of the bankruptcy case.136
Some courts have steered away from imposing a hard and fast rule and
determine eligibility to represent the debtor on a case-by-case basis; this
accommodates debtors whose estates are not probated and allows a person who
is knowledgeable about the financial affairs of the deceased debtor to represent
the debtor in the bankruptcy case.137 Specifically, In re Shorter reasoned that
Rule 1016 does not restrict who may represent a deceased debtor in bankruptcy
court.138 As such, bankruptcy courts should not impose their own limits that
would unnecessarily hinder further administration by an individual who is fully
able to represent a deceased debtor.139
3. Hardship Discharge
A hardship discharge is another option that can be pursued if a chapter 13
debtor dies before she has completed the plan payments. Under section 1328(b):
at any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and a
hearing, a court may grant a discharge to a debtor [who] has not
completed payments under the plan only if – (1) the debtor’s failure to
complete such payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor
should not justly be held accountable; (2) the value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of property actually distributed under the plan on
account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount
that would have been paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor had
been liquidated under chapter 7 . . . and (3) modification of the plan . .
. is not practicable.”140

The scope of the hardship discharge is not as broad as a regular discharge under
chapter 13.141 Instead, it contains similar exceptions to discharge as chapter 7

also In re Quint, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2881 at *4; In re Lucio, 251 B.R. 705, 709 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000)
(allowing the personal representative to represent the debtor at the first meeting of creditors in a chapter 7 case).
136
In re Oliver, 279 B.R. 69, 71 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y 2002).
137
See, e.g., In re Shorter, 544 B.R. 654, 661–62 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015); see also In re Levy, No. 1160130, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229, at *2–5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2014).
138
In re Shorter, 544 B.R. at 661 (stating that “Rule 1016, legislative history and intent, and case law
authorize or give standing to someone to pursue further administration . . . .”) (emphasis added).
139
Id. at 661–62.
140
11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2019); In re Shorter, 544 B.R. at 667.
141
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c); see also Discharge in Bankruptcy—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/discharge-bankruptcy-bankruptcy-
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does, including marital property settlement debts and willful and malicious
injury by the debtor to another entity or its property,142 as well as additional
exceptions including that it only applies to unsecured debts.143
The hardship discharge requirements were liberalized in the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.144 Specifically, Congress eliminated prior restrictions
“requiring the debtor himself to apply for the discharge and by eliminating a
time-in-plan requirement . . . .”145 Thus, these changes broadened the scope of
who could obtain a hardship discharge and opened the door for judges to grant
hardship discharges in cases involving the death of the debtor.
Granting a hardship discharge has been allowed upon the death of a debtor
in a majority of courts because the death of a debtor is an unforeseen
circumstance that should not prevent the debtor and his beneficiaries from
reaping the benefits of a discharge.146 Generally, these cases involve debtors
who have completed most of their plan payments because they have to satisfy
the second element of the statute: unsecured claimants have received at least as
much as they would have under chapter 7.147
However, several courts that did not award a hardship discharge justify their
decisions based on statutory interpretation.148 In re Miller interpreted the
language of Rule 1016, specifically “the case may proceed and be concluded in
the same manner, so far as possible, as though the death . . . had not occurred”

basics (last visited Jan. 13, 2021) (noting that the scope of a hardship discharge contains similar exceptions to
discharge under chapter 7, and thus is not as broad as a discharge under chapter 13).
142
See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a).
143
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(c).
144
See In re Inyard, 532 B.R. 364, 370 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015).
145
Id.; see Alan M. Ahart, Whether to Grant a Hardship Discharge in Chapter 13, 87 AM. BANKR. L.J.
559, 562 (2013) (stating that “the three-year term period was deleted, enabling the court to grant a hardship
discharge at any time after confirmation of the plan”).
146
See In re Shorter, 544 B.R. 654, 662–63 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015) (granting hardship discharge in
accordance with Rule 1016); In re Graham, 63 B.R. 95, 96 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1986) (reasoning that a hardship
discharge is warranted because the deceased debtor cannot be held accountable for his failure to complete the
payments); In re McNealy, 31 B.R. 932, 934–35 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (awarding hardship discharge because
the value of the payments made under the plan to the unsecured creditors was more than they would have
received under chapter 7); In re Bond, 36 B.R. 49, 51–52 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983); In re Inyard, 532 B.R. at
372–73; 3A Debtor-Creditor Law § 34.14[3][b][i] (2020) (“The death of the debtor is one circumstance which
courts have found to justify a hardship discharge.”).
147
See In re Shorter, 544 B.R. at 658 (“[The] death occurred between six and seven months prior to plan
completion.”); In re Graham, 63 B.R. at 96 (debtor owed $425.32 out of $5,600 at the time of death); In re
Inyard, 532 B.R. at 371–73 (debtor owed $575 out of $20,673 at the time of death).
148
See In re Miller, 526 B.R. 857, 861 (D. Colo. 2014); In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. 338, 342–43 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 2013); In re Hennessy, No. 11-13793, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3034, at *1–4 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. July 29,
2013). But see In re Lizzi, No. 10-13875, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1098, at *11–14 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2015).
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to only contemplate continued plan payments or dismissal, not a hardship
discharge.149 The court reasoned that it is not possible for the case to “be
concluded in the same manner” because the deceased debtor cannot continue
making the plan payments.150 Additionally, the use of the phrase “the court may
grant” in the hardship discharge statute gives the court discretion on whether to
award one.151 Also, the phrase “as though the death had not occurred” is
interpreted by some courts to prohibit using the death of a debtor as a factor in
support of a hardship discharge.152
Furthermore, courts that did not grant hardship discharges focused on the
policy of a “fresh start.”153 A deceased debtor clearly is unable to obtain a “fresh
start” because death extinguishes the debtor’s need to benefit from removing the
burden of debt, and therefore the decedent in such cases is not eligible for a
hardship discharge.154 In contrast, In re Lizzi posited that “entry of a discharge
is the normal conclusion for a chapter 13 case” because the debtor could have
received a hardship discharge if the debtor was still alive.155 The court further
reasoned that the statute governing a hardship discharge does not restrict who
can apply, so preventing a hardship discharge to be sought “impinges on a
debtor’s substantive right under § 1328(b).”156
4. Waiver of Financial Management Course and Domestic Support
Obligation Certificate
Chapter 13 debtors are required to complete a financial management course
and submit a domestic support obligation certificate to obtain a discharge in
bankruptcy.157 Under section 1328(g)(1), the court “shall not grant a discharge
under this section to a debtor unless after filing a petition the debtor has
completed an instructional course concerning personal financial management
described in section 111.”158 Under section 1328(a), a debtor who is required to
pay a domestic support obligation (DSO)159 must “certif[y] that all amounts
149

See In re Miller, 526 B.R. at 861.
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.; In re Hennessy, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3034 at *2–4.
153
See In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. at 342–43; In re Hennessy, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3034 at *2.
154
See In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. at 342–43; In re Hennessy, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 3034 at *4.
155
In re Lizzi, No. 10-13875, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1098, at *11–12 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2015).
156
Id. at *13.
157
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(g)(1) (2019) (financial management course); id. § 1328(a) (Domestic Support
Obligation certificate).
158
Id. § 1328(g)(1); see In re Levy, No. 11-60130, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
Mar. 31, 2014).
159
The Code defines a DSO as:
150
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payable under such order or such statute that are due on or before the date of
certification . . . have been paid . . . .”160 The DSO certification serves to confirm
that the debtor pays claims that are considered domestic support obligations and
assures that the court can award a discharge.161
Courts have consistently allowed the deceased debtor’s case to be discharged
if the debtor completed all of the plan payments but not the required financial
management course or the DSO certificate.162 The financial management course
requirement does not apply to debtors “whom the court determines, after notice
and hearing, is unable to complete [the personal financial management course]
because of . . . disability . . . .”163 Courts reason that death qualifies as a disability
under section 109(h)(4)164 and therefore a deceased debtor is excluded from
completing the course.165 Furthermore, the purpose of the financial management
course is to prevent the debtor from incurring financial trouble in the future,
which becomes moot if the debtor dies.166
This DSO certification neither alters the liability of the debtor nor prevents
further administration of the case.167 This is because DSOs are not dischargeable
in bankruptcy and “if not paid, a DSO is not affected by entry of a discharge.”168
Thus, any outstanding DSO payments on the decedent’s death would be paid by
her probate estate. Therefore, individuals with knowledge of the debtor’s

[A] debt that accrues before, on, or after the date of the order for relief in a case under this title
. . . that is owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor . . . or
governmental unit; in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support of such spouse, former
spouse, or child of the debtor . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 101(14A).
160
In re Bouton, No. 10-40989-EJC, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4231, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Oct. 7, 2013)
(quoting 11 U.S.C. 1328(a)).
161
In re Levy, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229 at *6–7.
162
See, e.g., In re Bouton, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4231 at *4–6; In re Levy, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229 at *5
(stating that “further administration can mean entry of a discharge even if the debtor does not comply with endof-the-case requirements”) (internal citations omitted).
163
11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4); In re Fogel, 550 B.R. 532, 537 (D. Colo. 2015).
164
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h)(4) (stating that “disability means that the debtor is so physically impaired as to
be unable, after reasonable effort, to participate . . . .”).
165
See, e.g., In re Bouton, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 4231 at *5–6 (citing White v. Glenville Bank, No. 6:11cv-82, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157772, at *8 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 16, 2011) (“Death is a disability, and a debtor’s
inability to complete an instructional course does not preclude a posthumous discharge.”)); cf. In re Fogel, 550
B.R. at 537 (finding that “death constitutes ‘incapacity’ for the purpose of Section 109(h)(4).”).
166
See In re Trembulak, 362 B.R. 205, 207 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007); In re Lizzi, No. 10-13875, 2015 Bankr.
LEXIS 1098, at *22 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2015).
167
See In re Levy, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229 at *8.
168
See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a); In re Levy, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229 at *8 (stating that “a DSO certification
is more form than substance.”).
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finances have been deemed allowed to complete the certifications on the
debtor’s behalf.169
B. Best Interests of the Parties
Another split among courts exists over whose interests the court should
consider in determining what is in the “best interests of the parties.”170 Some
courts go beyond the typical parties to the case (the debtor, creditors, and trustee)
and consider the interests of all who are affected by the bankruptcy
administration, including the spouse of a deceased debtor.171 Courts have also
considered the debtor’s estate in determining the best interests of the parties,172
as well as the interests of the debtor’s heirs’ and beneficiaries.173
In re Oliver specifically considered the interests of the decedent’s
beneficiaries.174 The court noted that the debtor’s beneficiaries had an interest in
avoiding dismissal because there were several exempt assets that they would be
eligible to receive if the case was continued until discharge.175 In re Lucio also
considered the beneficiaries of the debtor, noting that they will benefit from the
debtor’s discharge by taking any excess assets after the bankruptcy case
concludes.176 Furthermore, the beneficiaries are vested with beneficial rights to
the decedent’s assets upon the decedent’s death.177 Although creditors have
greater rights to the non-exempt property, the beneficiaries still have a strong
interest in maximizing their potential inheritance and seeing the decedent’s pre169
See In re Levy, 2014 Bankr. LEXIS 1229 at *10 (finding that “a person with specific knowledge of the
deceased debtor’s finances may act on behalf of the debtor in completing the § 1328(a) and (h) certifications”
and “the person must file an affidavit outlining sufficient factual foundation in order to establish a fitting record”
to establish knowledge); In re Chaffer, No. 6:12-bk-23201, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1621, at *6 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
May 15, 2017) (stating that “[t]he Court will not outright waive a requirement imposed by the Bankruptcy Code,
but will allow the requirement to be satisfied by an individual with ‘specific knowledge of the deceased debtor’s
finances.”).
170
In re Shorter, 544 B.R. 654, 664 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015) (“Courts are divided on which parties must
benefit from further administration under Rule 1016.”).
171
See, e.g., id. at 664–65 (Reasoning that the wife’s interests should be considered because she is the
surviving spouse, enabled her husband to fulfill his plan obligations, and has a stake in seeing the discharge
granted); In re Conn, No. 13-62278, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1925, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio June 12, 2015) (“Since
a discharge will be of little benefit to a deceased debtor, the real inquiry in this case will be what is in the best
interest of the creditors and Debtor’s surviving spouse.”).
172
See, e.g., In re Sales, No. 03-60861, 2006 Bankr. LEXIS 2373, at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sep. 15, 1006)
(considering the debtor’s estate in determining whether to grant a hardship discharge).
173
See, e.g., In re Inyard, 532 B.R. 364, 372 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015) (considering heirs); In re Lucio, 251
B.R. 705, 708 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000) (same).
174
See In re Oliver, 279 B.R. 69, 70 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y 2002).
175
Id.
176
In re Lucio, 251 B.R. at 708.
177
Young, supra note 34, at 381–82.
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petition debts discharged under bankruptcy.178 In considering the interests of a
deceased debtor, it is “appropriate to consider the equities with respect to the
Debtor himself, because . . . despite his death, he remains eligible for further
administration of his case, and he is an appropriate person for consideration
when balancing the equities.”179 Courts have also characterized the decedent’s
personal representative as an “interested party” regarding the exempt property
and having an interest in seeking the “in personam relief of liability for
dischargeable debts.”180
Creditors’ interests are always considered by the bankruptcy court in
determining whether to continue a deceased debtor’s case. Some courts also
consider the interests of the post-petition creditors.181 Courts will consider how
to evaluate the creditors’ interests depending on the facts and circumstances of
each case.182 In re Stewart acknowledged that if the case did not continue, the
decedent’s heirs would no longer fund the secured creditors claims. In response,
the secured creditors would then foreclose on their secured asset, leaving no
equity left for the unsecured creditors in probate.183 Alternatively, In re Spiser
considered the value of the decedent’s homestead, which would be sufficient to
pay off creditors in probate court, and thus dismissed the case.184 Furthermore,
if only unsecured non-priority creditors have not received their full distribution,
the court will likely evaluate whether they received at least as much as they
would have under chapter 7, and award a hardship discharge under these
circumstances.185
Additionally, in determining what is in the best interests of the parties, courts
consider the amount that creditors have already received and how many
payments the debtor made premortem.186 For example, cases that are early in the

178

Young, supra note 34, at 381–82.
In re Inyard, 532 B.R. 364, 372 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015); see In re Shorter, 544 B.R. 654, 665 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 2015) (“Case law, legislative history, Section 1328(b), and Rule 1016 support the finding that a
deceased debtor is still a party to an open and ongoing bankruptcy.”).
180
In re McNealy, 31 B.R. 932, 935 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (italics in original). When a debtor’s
bankruptcy case is discharged, the debtor is relieved from personal liability on the debts as differentiated from
in rem liability that still remains if there is a lien on their property. Thus, the lien can still be enforced despite
discharge. Id.; see Young, supra note 34, at 368 (“and the discharge [if granted] will apply in persona to relieve
the debtor, and this his probate representative, of liability for dischargeable debts.”) (alterations in original).
181
See, e.g., In re Inyard, 532 B.R. at 371–72.
182
See, e.g., In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 537 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007).
183
In re Stewart, No. 01-66434-fra13, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1042, at *3 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 2, 2004).
184
In re Spiser, 232 B.R. 669, 673–74 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).
185
See In re Inyard, 532 B.R. at 371–72.
186
See, e.g., In re Shorter, 544 B.R. 654, 663 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015) (considering the decedent’s
profession and ability to pay).
179
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process such that the debtor had only made a few plan payments premortem are
not likely to be eligible for a hardship discharge. This is because the unsecured
creditors probably would not have received as much as they would have under
chapter 7. Consideration of the creditors’ interests would strongly support
another option such as converting to chapter 7 rather than granting a hardship
discharge.
II. ANALYSIS
As shown below, allowing continuation of a chapter 13 bankruptcy case
postmortem is in the best interests of the deceased debtor, creditors, and the
deceased debtor’s beneficiaries. The debtor is rewarded posthumously for her
time and effort in developing a payment plan and attempting to pay creditors
back. Continuation of the case will also encourage debtors who have an option
of seeking chapter 7 or chapter 13 relief to choose chapter 13, which is the
favored chapter pursuant to the rules set forth in the Code.187 This serves a public
interest of encouraging people to allocate their disposable income to pay back
their debts. Creditors as a whole are better off in bankruptcy cases than they are
in probate proceedings because of how their claims are treated in bankruptcy
court. Handling the creditors’ claims in probate can be risky because the assets
subject to their claims are also subjected to claims by post-petition creditors.
Beneficiaries also fare better if the case continues in bankruptcy court because
the exempt assets, and possibly assets in the bankruptcy estate, can be distributed
to them according to the decedent’s will or intestate distribution.
Furthermore, the underlying motivation behind Rule 1016 is that
continuation of bankruptcy cases should be pursued despite the challenges that
come from the death of the debtor. The language “so far as possible” in Rule
1016:
contemplates that a bankruptcy court may need to take extraordinary
steps in order to administer the estate of a debtor who has died or is
incompetent. A contrary reading would render the language “so far as
possible” superfluous, and the statute would simply require that the
case proceed as normal, without making allowances for the unique
issues that would undoubtedly arise if a debtor died or became
incompetent.188

187
188

See DeJarnatt, supra note 83, at 605 (“Reorganizations are to be encouraged.”).
In re Moss, 239 B.R. 537, 541 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1999).
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A. Debtors
An individual debtor who is eligible to file under chapter 7 or chapter 13 has
an important decision to make when faced with the prospect of bankruptcy.
Chapter 13 requires much more time and effort from the debtor, because it forces
the debtor to live on a tight budget for three to five years and dedicate all
disposable income to creditors.189 However, there are benefits to filing under
chapter 13. First, the debtor will be able to retain her assets, which will then be
potentially available to pass to her beneficiaries upon her death. Second, the
creditors are likely to receive more than they would have received under chapter
7. The creditors’ only available payment is from liquidating the debtor’s assets
in chapter 7. However, under chapter 13, the creditors are able to access the
debtor’s disposable income, which can yield greater payment potential. As such,
the outcome of a bankruptcy case of a chapter 13 debtor who dies post plan
confirmation should not be worse than if the debtor originally filed under
chapter 7.
Rule 1016 allows a chapter 7 case to continue without any limitations if the
debtor dies during the case. This different treatment from the deceased chapter
13 debtor is valid because the bankruptcy estate was completely and unilaterally
controlled by the chapter 7 trustee while the debtor was alive. Thus, the debtor
had little to no involvement in the case premortem.190 Similarly, if the chapter
13 case is converted to chapter 7, the trustee will take complete and sole control
of the bankruptcy estate and have no interaction with the decedent’s personal
representative or the beneficiaries. As such, the chapter 7 case can continue
easily without the debtor.
A chapter 13 debtor, on the other hand, is actively involved in the bankruptcy
case because she maintains control over the property of the bankruptcy estate
and sends installments of her disposable income to the trustee, who distributes
the payments to the creditors.191 This active involvement could inform a rule that
would discontinue the case after the debtor’s death, or permit continuation only
if the debtor completed all the required payments premortem and did not
complete the required courses to obtain a discharge.192 However, Rule 1016 does
not contain such parameters. It was written to be very broad and thus
encompasses circumstances in which the debtor did not complete all of the plan
189
190
191
192

trustee).

See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (2019).
See In re Waring, 555 B.R. 754, 761 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2016).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a).
See id. §§ 1328(g)(1), 111(b) (lists the qualifications for a course to be approved by the United States
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payments before death. Therefore, continuation of the case—especially if the
debtor dies post plan confirmation—should satisfy Rule 1016’s limitations.
A confirmed payment plan provides a clear roadmap of how much each
creditor will receive and allows the debtor’s beneficiaries to determine if they
want to continue payments on the debtor’s behalf. If the debtor’s beneficiaries
are willing to make the plan payments, there are no barriers to continuing the
case, and inequitable treatment among chapter 13 and chapter 7 debtors is
avoided. Potential dismissal of a chapter 13 case could discourage individuals
from filing under chapter 13 for fear that their hard work to obtain a discharge
will not be rewarded.193
The dismissal may also affect the distribution of assets that the debtor
intended to be passed on to her family. Not only can creditors reach probate
assets but they can also reach some nonprobate assets.194 For example, creditors
can reach “Totten Trusts”—“savings accounts in the name of the settlor ‘as
trustee’ for the settlor for life, remainder to another”195—and inter vivos
revocable trust assets postmortem because they could have done so while the
settlor was alive.196 Furthermore, creditors can go after an insurance trust if the
estate is a beneficiary, but not if a testamentary trust is the beneficiary.197 These
assets are also subjected to claims from post-petition creditors, which further
reduces the amount available for distribution and makes it less likely for the
beneficiaries to receive their expected distribution. As such, the benefits of
continuing the bankruptcy case should not abate if the two criteria contained in
Rule 1016 are met.
B. Creditors
Each state has a statute that mandates the priority of claims in probate. The
priority of claims in Georgia is as follows: a year’s worth of expenses for the
family; funeral expenses; other necessary expenses of administration, including
fees incurred by personal representatives and by attorneys for the estate;
reasonable expenses of the decedent’s last illness; unpaid taxes or other debts
due to the state or the United States; judgments, secured interests, and other liens
193

See In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 536 (Bankr. S.D. III. 2007).
See JEFFREY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, QUICK REVIEW: WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 186–92 (5th
ed. 2016).
195
Id. at 189; see Elaine H. Gagliardi, Remembering the Creditor at Death: Aligning Probate and
Nonprobate Transfers, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 819, 861 (2007).
196
See PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 194, at 186–87 (citing State St. Bank & Tr. Co. v. Reiser, 7 Mass.
App. Ct. 633, 638–39 (1979)); Gagliardi, supra note 195, at 856.
197
See PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 194, at 195; Gagliardi, supra note 195, at 864.
194
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created during the lifetime of the decedent, to be paid according to their priority
lien;198 and all other claims.199 Thus, depending on where a creditor’s claim falls
in the order of priority will determine the amount, if any, she will be paid.
In chapter 13, the payment plan must provide for the full payment of all
priority unsecured claims listed under section 507, unless the creditor agrees
otherwise.200 A confirmed payment plan must also meet certain criteria that
protect general unsecured creditors. The plan must satisfy two tests: the “best
interests test” and the “disposable income requirement.”201 Under the best
interests test, unsecured creditors must receive at least as much as they would
have if the debtor filed under chapter 7.202 Under the disposable income
requirement, the debtor is required to provide all projected disposable income
for the full commitment period if the unsecured creditors are not paid in full. 203
This is because disposable income is the only source of an unsecured creditor’s
repayment.204 Calculating the projected disposable income requires a
determination of whether the debtor’s current monthly income is above or below
the state median of similar households.205 If the debtor’s current monthly income
is below the state’s median, the court deducts “amounts reasonably necessary to
be expended . . . for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of
the debtor” using the debtor’s actual expenses in the calculation.206 However, if
the debtor’s current monthly income is above the state median, the court uses
the same expenses that are used in the chapter 7 means test.207 “Generally
speaking, the means test calculates projected disposable income by permitting
the deduction from income of four distinct types of expenses: (1) living
198

See Ga. Code Ann. § 11-9-333 (list of priority liens in order of what type should be paid first).
Id. § 53-7-40(1)–(7).
200
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(2) (2019). Creditors might agree otherwise because they want to maintain a
relationship with the debtor.
201
See id. § 1325.
202
See id. § 1325(a)(4).
203
See id. § 1325(b)(2) (Defining disposable income as current monthly income reduced by reasonable
expenses for the maintenance or support of the debtor or dependents of the debtor and for charitable
contributions); id. § 1322(d) (Determines the commitment period. If the projected disposable income is above
the median of the state, the plan will be 5 years. If the income is below median, the plan will be at least 3 years
long.); id. § 1325(b); see also Jean M. Radler, What Constitutes “Disposable Income” Under § 1325(b) of the
Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11 U.S.C.A. § 1325(b)), Providing That All Disposable Income for Specified Period
Must be Applied to Plan for Payment of Creditors, 138 A.L.R. FED. 547, at *2a (1997) (“The disposable income
requirement applies only if there is an objection to confirmation by the trustee or by the holder of an allowed
unsecured claim.”).
204
See Radler, supra note 203, at *2a.
205
See EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 256 (The court has more or less discretion in determining the
reasonably necessary expenses that will be deducted to calculate the projected disposable income of the debtor).
206
See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(2)(A)(i).
207
See id. §§ 707(b)(2), 1325(b)(3).
199
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expenses, as determined by . . . IRS standards; (2) monthly secured debt
payments; (3) amounts required to pay priority debts in full; and (4) other
administrative and special purpose expenses.”208
There are three alternatives that can satisfy secured creditor claims. First, the
creditor can accept the proposed payment plan.209 Second, the debtor can
surrender property securing a claim to the claimholder.210 Third, secured
creditors must accept a plan that provides as much value as the amount of their
allowed claim.211 If the case was dismissed and handled under probate, creditors
would not be provided with this degree of fairness or certainty in determining
the value that they will receive. For example, administrative costs—such as
taxes against the estate and attorney and accountant fees—are a priority claim in
bankruptcy and, like all priority claims under chapter 13, are required to be paid
in full.212 There will be less money available to pay creditors if the bankruptcy
case is dismissed and creditors must assert their claims in probate because estate
administration expenses must be paid before satisfying creditors’ unsecured
claims.213 Thus, the confirmed payment plan gives creditors certainty on the
amount that they will be paid if the chapter 13 case is continued, whereas it is
not clear how much they will receive if their claim is addressed in probate. Of
equal importance to creditors is the saving of time and money that they would
expend if they must assert their claims in probate.
C. The Interests of the Deceased Debtor’s Beneficiaries
The deceased debtor’s beneficiaries have been considered “interested
parties” to the bankruptcy case in a few cases because they reap the benefits of
any discharge of the deceased debtor’s debts.214 “The ultimate beneficiaries of
the discharge will, of course, be the beneficiaries, who will take any excess
assets (and all exempt property) free of bankruptcy claims.”215 Chapter 13
preserves the debtor’s property, including property in the bankruptcy estate.216
208

EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 256.
11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(A).
210
Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
211
Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). This is referred to as the “cram down exception”, which allows the debtor to
reduce the creditor’s claim to the value of the collateral securing the claim without consent of the creditors, but
subject to certain restraints. Id.
212
Id. § 1322(a)(2).
213
See Ga. Code Ann. § 53-6-61 (including executor fees, attorneys’ fees, accounting fees, appraisal fees,
and court costs).
214
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1016.04 (16th ed. 2020) (outlines three options if a debtor in a chapter
13 case dies, one of which is allowing the case to continue for the benefit of the debtor’s estate).
215
In re Lucio, 251 B.R. 705, 710 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000).
216
11 U.S.C. § 1306(b).
209
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Preservation of this property benefits the debtor while alive, and the debtor’s
beneficiaries who receive that property after the debtor’s death.217 Although the
debtor’s heirs are not personally liable for the decedent’s debts, the decedent’s
probate estate is liable.218 Thus, this interferes with the expected distribution to
the beneficiaries. Therefore, the interests of the debtor’s beneficiaries are the
same as those of the debtor and courts properly consider those beneficiaries in
determining whether to proceed with the chapter 13 case.219
Beneficiaries are also parties who may be willing to complete plan payments
for the deceased debtor “as though the [debtor’s] death . . . had not occurred.”220
At least one court has allowed the debtor’s children to make the remaining
payments under the plan, because completing those payments was in the best
interests of the creditors and the beneficiaries.221 In re Stewart provided two
reasons for permitting the beneficiaries to continue the case through making the
plan payments.222 First, if the case was instead dismissed, the secured creditors
would foreclose because they would no longer be receiving any payments, and
there would be no equity left for unsecured creditors.223 Second, the debtor
followed the plan requirements and her “family should not be deprived of the
benefits of these efforts: to do so would effectively penalize the debtor for
having elected to reorganize.”224
Following the logic of Rule 1016—which explicitly permits a chapter 13
case to continue after a debtor dies—allowing beneficiaries to continue the plan
payments provides the most straightforward resolution of the case and ultimate
discharge, “as though the death [of the debtor] . . . did not occur.”225 This
provides creditors with the expected payments and allows the beneficiaries to
receive the assets they would have received if the debtor did not die and the case
continued to discharge. Additionally, it encourages debtors to file under Chapter
13, because their families will be able to continue the plan payments, receive a

217
See PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 194, at 20 (If the decedent dies intestate, the probate court still
has responsibility over distribution of the assets. Personal property is distributed pursuant to the law of the state
the decedent was domiciled in, whereas real property is distributed pursuant to the state in which the real property
is located).
218
See In re Lizzi, No. 10-13875, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1098, at *14 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2015)
(“Liability transfers to the decedent’s probate estate.”).
219
See In re Oliver, 279 B.R. 69, 70 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y 2002).
220
FED. R. BANK. P. 1016.
221
In re Stewart, No. 01-66434-fra13, 2004 Bankr. LEXIS 1042, at *1–5 (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 2, 2004).
222
Id.
223
Id. at *3.
224
Id.
225
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016.
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discharge, and not be worse off than if the debtor filed under chapter 7.226
Disallowing the beneficiaries or the personal representative to continue plan
payments would negate the beneficial impact of applying Rule 1016 and prevent
all parties from receiving their expected distributions. Furthermore, Georgia’s
Probate Code recognizes the right of heirs, beneficiaries, or any other person to
assume the deceased debtor’s debt with the creditor’s agreement.227 In both
bankruptcy and probate, the debtor’s heirs are not personally liable for the
decedent’s debts,228 but the assets that would be passed down to the debtor’s
beneficiaries—that are classified as non-exempt under state probate law—are
subject to creditors.229 Thus, like in the probate context, heirs should be able to
complete the payments for a deceased debtor in bankruptcy.
D. Continuation of the Case by the Deceased Debtor’s Personal
Representative
The language in Rule 1016 points to continuation of the case in the absence
of the debtor, and thus contemplates the need for a representative.230 The
decedent’s personal representative has been permitted to represent the debtor by
many courts.231 However, part of the reasoning behind disallowing a personal
representative from stepping in the debtor’s shoes is that it sidesteps the
restriction on probate estates from filing for bankruptcy.232 The fact that a
decedent’s personal representative cannot initially file for bankruptcy should not
prevent the representative from taking the place of the decedent in an ongoing
bankruptcy case. The personal representative cannot file for chapter 13
bankruptcy because only “individuals” qualify for chapter 13 and an estate is not
an individual.233 However, allowing a personal representative to continue the

226

See In re Oliver, 279 B.R. 69, 71 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y 2002).
Ga. Code. Ann. § 53-7-44(3).
228
In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. 338, 342–43 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013).
229
See PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 194, at 17–18.
230
See In re Vetter, No. 11-03988-dd, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2017, at *5 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 7, 2012)
(“[U]pon the death of a debtor, counsel for a deceased debtor should ordinarily promptly notify the Court of the
debtor’s death and file a motion for designation of an appropriate person to act on the debtor’s behalf.”).
231
See In re Kosinski, No. 10-bk-28949, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 779, at *9 (Bankr. N.D. III. Mar. 5, 2015);
In re Quint, No. 11-04296-jw, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2881, at *3–4 (Bankr. D.S.C. June 22, 2012); In re Lucio,
251 B.R. 705, 709 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000).
232
In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. at 342–43 (“Since a probate estate cannot file for bankruptcy directly, it
should not be permitted to do so indirectly by using a mechanism that does not exist. It cannot be substituted for
the debtor.”).
233
In re Walters, 113 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1990) (“Courts have uniformly supported the
contention that the Bankruptcy Code’s definitions of ‘person’ and ‘debtor’ exclude insolvent decedents’
estates.”); 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 101.41 (16th ed. 2020) (stating that probate estate is not included in
the definition of “person” under the Bankruptcy Code and therefore it cannot file for bankruptcy).
227

BYRNE_4.19.21

2021]

4/19/2021 10:47 AM

CONTINUATION OF CHAPTER 13 POSTMORTEM

455

bankruptcy case would not violate eligibility requirements that were met
premortem. The personal representative is further distanced from her role in
probate by the fact that the probate assets are kept separate from the assets in the
bankruptcy estate.234
Instead, the personal representative is representing a debtor who has died
after filing for chapter 13 and already has a confirmed payment plan in place.
Because the debtor met the requirements to file under chapter 13 premortem, the
personal representative steps in to continue the bankruptcy case, which is
consistent with Rule 1016 by allowing the case to continue as though the debtor
did not die.235 If eligibility must be reassessed after a debtor dies, then no case
could continue because a deceased individual can never qualify to be a debtor
under chapter 13.236 For these reasons, Rule 1016 must permit the case to
continue if the debtor dies, and the personal representative is in the best position
to represent the debtor’s interests in bankruptcy.237
E. Recharacterization of the Fresh Start Principle
The fresh start principle is one of the main policy goals of bankruptcy law,
with some courts citing it as the purpose of a bankruptcy case.238 This principle
is defined as “the opportunity for an individual debtor to obtain relief from
indebtedness and begin anew as a productive member of society.”239 It is also
embodied in the exemption and discharge provisions of the Code.240 Imposing
strict adherence to the fresh start principle can yield negative and illogical
outcomes, as illustrated in In re Langley.241 In this case, spouses who filed jointly
under chapter 13 passed away before completing their plan payments.242 Their
daughter sought to convert the case to chapter 7 or to complete the plan payments

234

See Young, supra note 34, at 368.
See Young, supra note 34, at 368 (“The bankruptcy proceeding [may] continue in rem with respect to
the property of the [bankruptcy] estate, and the discharge [if granted] will apply in personam to relieve the
debtor, and this his probate representative, of liability for dischargeable debts.”) (internal citations omitted).
236
See In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 535 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007).
237
In re Vetter, No. 11-03988-dd, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 2017, at *2 n.2 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 7, 2012)
(stating a probate representative “may most often be the appropriate party to perform the debtor’s duties.”).
238
See, e.g., In re Langley, No. 05-61279, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4219, at *3 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sept. 28,
2009).
239
Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction
of the Consumer Credit Amendments, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 60 (1986).
240
Id. at 62.
241
In re Langley, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4219 at *1–3 (dismissing bankruptcy petition after death since there
would be no fresh start).
242
Id. at *1–2.
235
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herself.243 The court reasoned that the best interest of the parties would not be
served through further administration because the deceased debtors could not
benefit from the discharge, even though payments under chapter 13 would yield
a dividend to unsecured creditors.244 Furthermore, the court’s sole focus on the
fresh start principle led the court to decline to speculate whether the creditors’
claims would even be improved in probate.245 This lack of interest on the effects
of dismissal on the debtor, the beneficiaries, and the creditors reflects the harm
that can stem from solely focusing on the fresh start principle. “This rigid
adherence to procedure, without adequate consideration given to the practical
implications or alternatives to that procedure, illustrates a serious problem in the
administration of some chapter 13 plans.”246
Furthermore, courts are inconsistent in applying the fresh start principle
between chapter 7 and chapter 13 cases. Following Rule 1016, chapter 7 cases
are continued to discharge, with no option for dismissal if the debtor dies postfiling.247 If courts define a fresh start as freeing the debtor from her debt so she
can begin anew, then a deceased chapter 7 debtor, like a deceased chapter 13
debtor, cannot benefit from the fresh start. Thus, following that logic, chapter 7
cases that involve a deceased debtor should be dismissed. However, Rule 1016
is not structured that way and thus, this principle should not determine whether
a chapter 13 case is dismissed. Strictly applying the fresh start principle to
deceased chapter 13 debtors and not deceased chapter 7 debtors leads to
inequitable results. Additionally, In re Shorter interpreted Rule 1016 to display
“[c]ongressional intent that a deceased debtor without need of a fresh start may
nevertheless receive a discharge posthumously.”248 The fresh start principle is
meant to reflect Congress’s sentiment that it is better to reward debtors who file
for bankruptcy with a discharge of some debts, rather than letting creditors fight
it out with the possibility of never collecting any payments. This also comports
with the second aim of bankruptcy: “providing for efficient debt collection.”249
“As a debt collection device, bankruptcy provides equitable treatment for
creditors and avoids the race between creditors to collection that often results
under state insolvency laws.”250 Although court opinions regarding a deceased
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debtor lack discussion of this goal of bankruptcy, allowing the case to continue
after plan confirmation achieves this goal. Therefore, courts should avoid
focusing on whether a deceased debtor can obtain a fresh start in deciding
whether to continue her case.
Instead, courts should broaden the fresh start principle in cases that involve
a deceased debtor. Rather than interpreting fresh start to only benefit a living
debtor, courts should extend it to the people who realize the benefits in her place:
the debtor’s beneficiaries. Recognizing that the benefit of the fresh start can be
appreciated by the debtor’s beneficiaries would allow the case to continue if the
debtor dies and Rule 1016 would not be null because there would be a purpose
in continuing the case. Also, prior courts that consider the deceased debtor’s
interest reason that a goal of bankruptcy is to give “deserving” debtors a fresh
start, and the debtor’s death doesn’t make her any less deserving.251
Furthermore, the timing of the debtor’s death after plan confirmation should
not make the debtor any less deserving of discharge. A strict adherence to the
fresh start principle treats a debtor who dies the day after discharge as more
deserving than a debtor who dies a day before discharge. In both situations, the
debtor would not reap the benefit of the traditional view of the fresh start; the
benefit would be reaped by her beneficiaries. Recognizing that the beneficiaries
can benefit from the fresh start of the debtor comports “with the long-standing
general principle that the death of the debtor does not abate a bankruptcy
proceeding.”252 Therefore, an inability to point to the fresh start a deceased
debtor could receive should not prevent courts from continuing a case.
F. Conversion to Chapter 7
The inability of the debtor’s beneficiaries to complete payments under the
confirmed plan supports the alternative option of converting the case to chapter
7. The language of Rule 1016—specifically, “the estate shall be administered
and the case concluded in the same manner, so far as possible, as though the
death . . . had not occurred”253—contemplates conversion because the debtor
could have converted the case to chapter 7 if she was still alive and unable to
continue making payments under the repayment plan.254 Additionally, not
allowing conversion under chapter 13 would impose an eligibility requirement
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In re Perkins, 381 B.R. 530, 533 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2007).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 1016.
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after filing that is not imposed on a deceased chapter 7 debtor.255 Chapter 7 cases
continue to be administered even though the deceased debtor is no longer a
“person” under section 109(b) “and the deceased debtor’s estate may receive a
discharge.”256 Thus, preventing a deceased debtor’s chapter 13 case from being
converted to chapter 7 and receiving a discharge would be inequitable and would
punish debtors for choosing to file under chapter 13 instead of chapter 7.257
Furthermore, if eligibility to convert the case is determined at the time of
conversion, it would eliminate any type of continuation.258 Because a debtor
under chapter 13 must be an individual with regular income, a deceased debtor
does not satisfy this definition and there would be no continuation as
contemplated under Rule 1016.259 Therefore, following the language of Rule
1016, courts should allow conversion if the debtor dies.
Conversion to chapter 7 will liquidate non-exempt assets in the bankruptcy
estate and pay the proceeds to the remaining creditors.260 This procedure benefits
unsecured creditors who might not receive anything if the case was taken out of
bankruptcy and their claims were handled in probate court. This is because there
are a number of priority claims that can take precedence over claims of
unsecured creditors in probate.261 The debtor’s beneficiaries would also benefit
from conversion because the debtor’s exempt and post-petition assets would
remain untouched by pre-petition creditors. Those assets can then be used to pay
any post-petition creditors and administration costs,262 increasing the chance that
there will be assets left over for the beneficiaries.263

255

See In re Perkins, 381 B.R. at 536.
Id.; see In re Bond, 36 B.R. 49, 51 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984).
257
In re Perkins, 381 B.R. at 536.
258
See In re Jarrett, 19 B.R. 413, 414 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1982) (“In that the debtor is deceased, it is evident
that he does not meet the necessary prerequisites to be a chapter 13 debtor.”).
259
In re Perkins, 381 B.R. at 535.
260
See In re Roberts, 570 B.R. 532, 541 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2017) (reasoning conversion was permitted
and benefitted unsecured creditors that would have received nothing in the chapter 13 case).
261
Ga. Code. Ann. § 53-7-40.
262
See id. § 53-6-61 (“Personal representatives shall be allowed reasonable expenses incurred in the
administration of the estate . . . .”).
263
In re Oliver, 279 B.R. 69, 71 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y 2002).
256

BYRNE_4.19.21

2021]

4/19/2021 10:47 AM

CONTINUATION OF CHAPTER 13 POSTMORTEM

459

The following chart displays the different parties’ access to the decedent’s
assets under each circumstance that can occur in the bankruptcy case
postmortem.

G. Hardship Discharge
A hardship discharge is an option in cases in which the unsecured creditors
have already received an amount at least equal to what they would have received
under chapter 7 and if the personal representative or the estate’s beneficiaries
are unwilling to complete the plan payments. Section 1328(b) provides that:
at any time after the confirmation of the plan and after notice and a
hearing, the court may grant a discharge to a debtor that has not
completed payments under the plan only if – (1) the debtor’s failure to
complete such payments is due to circumstances for which the debtor
should not justly be held accountable; (2) the value, as of the effective
date of the plan, of property actually distributed under the plan on
account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount
that would have been paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor had
been liquidated under chapter 7 . . .; and (3) modification of the
plan . . . is not practicable.264

The debtor dying post plan confirmation often satisfies all the elements required
to grant a hardship discharge. First, the debtor cannot be held accountable for
her own death.265 Second, ensuring that allowed unsecured claims receive at
least as much as they would have received under chapter 7 obviates the need to
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11 U.S.C. § 1328(b) (2019).
In re Lizzi, No. 10-13875, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 1098, at *15 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2015). Although
there are no cases that involve a debtor committing suicide, it would be interesting to see how a court would rule
on this. If suicide is viewed as a choice by the debtor, then this element of a hardship discharge would not be
satisfied. However, if suicide is viewed as a result of severe mental illness, then this element may be satisfied.
265

BYRNE_4.19.21

460

4/19/2021 10:47 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

convert the case to chapter 7. Third, courts find that the plan is not modifiable
because the debtor is deceased, which ends the regular source of income.266
A hardship discharge benefits the interests of the deceased debtor by
preventing her from receiving worse treatment because she tried to repay her
creditors by filing under chapter 13 instead of filing under chapter 7.267 Because
the statute requires that the debtor pay unsecured creditors at least as much as
they would have received under chapter 7, the debtor should receive a discharge
as if she filed under chapter 7. Furthermore, a hardship discharge has little
impact on creditors if the debtor meets all the elements of the statute.268 The
statute protects unsecured creditors via the second element needed to grant a
hardship discharge requiring that creditors have received at least as much as they
would have received under chapter 7.269 Secured and priority unsecured
creditors are paid in full before non-priority unsecured creditors have received
any payment, so to meet the second element, secured creditors and priority
unsecured creditors likely would have already been paid in full.270 Additionally,
secured creditors also have the option of exercising their lien if they are not paid
the full allowed amount of their claim, further protecting their interests.271
A hardship discharge also benefits the deceased debtor’s beneficiaries by
allowing them to keep property devised to them without being subject to claims
from pre-petition creditors because these debts will be discharged.272 This option
offers an even greater benefit for debtors who have minimal assets that can be
used to help the family pay necessary expenses.273 For example, In re Shorter
demonstrated that the benefit to the debtor and his spouse in using his assets
toward his funeral expenses and avoiding probate outweighed the unsecured
creditors’ interest in possibly receiving the balance of their claims in probate.274
Thus, a hardship discharge is a viable option in cases in which a debtor dies far
enough along in the case that all of the elements to grant a hardship discharge
are met, especially if the debtor has only minimal assets that can be used to pay
off necessary expenses.
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CONCLUSION
Rule 1016 leaves much discretion to judges to decide how to proceed in
cases if a chapter 13 debtor dies post plan confirmation but before discharge.
This discretion has led to inconsistent decisions among the various bankruptcy
courts. The best approach is for courts to consider the circumstances of each case
and to either allow the beneficiaries of the debtor to continue plan payments,
convert to chapter 7, or award a hardship discharge.
Courts that dismiss a bankruptcy case postmortem reason that the debtor
cannot benefit from the fresh start that a discharge under bankruptcy law offers.
Although the debtor receiving a fresh start is an important principle of
bankruptcy law, to solely rely on this principle to disallow a chapter 13 case to
continue postmortem negates the time and effort spent by the creditors and the
debtor in confirming and carrying out a repayment plan. If courts enforce this
principle against chapter 13 debtors but not chapter 7 debtors, courts would be
punishing the chapter 13 debtors and their beneficiaries for choosing to file
under chapter 13.275
While the option for dismissal under chapter 13 is reasonable in
circumstances where the debtor dies before plan confirmation, the plain
language of Rule 1016 should be construed to permit continuation post plan
confirmation, either through payments by the debtor’s beneficiaries or
conversion to chapter 7. Alternatively, if the debtor’s case satisfies the elements
to grant a hardship discharge, courts should strongly consider the hardship
discharge to be a useful option instead of simply dismissing the chapter 13 case.
Resolution of this issue is important because it will create uniformity among
bankruptcy courts and more certainty to both beneficiaries of the decedent and
her creditors.
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